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CRIMES AND OFFENSES 
Offenses Against Public Order and Safety: Amend Part 1 of Article 
3 of Chapter 11 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated, Relating to Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, Surveillance, 
and Related Offenses, so as to Change Provisions Relating to 
Interception of Wire or Oral Transmissions by Law Enforcement 
Officers; Change Provisions Relating to the Application and 
Issuance of Orders Authorizing Installation and Use of Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device; Provide for Related Matters; 
Provide for an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for 
Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A §§ 16-11-64, -64.1 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER:  HB 55 
ACT NUMBER: 2 
GEORGIA LAWS:  2013 Ga. Laws 4 
SUMMARY: The Act clarifies the jurisdictional 
requirements of a judge issuing a 
wiretap authorization. A superior court 
judge that has jurisdiction over the 
crime under investigation may issue 
investigation warrants permitting the 
use of surveillance devices, such as 
wiretaps. The Act provides these 
warrants shall have state-wide 
application. Likewise, the Act grants 
state-wide application to warrants that 
authorize and approve the installation 
of pen register and trap and trace 
devices. Further, the Act allows the 
interception devices to be located 
anywhere in the state. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: February 13, 2013 
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History 
On January 7, 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the 
Gwinnett County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a 
wiretap warrant where the tapped phones or listening posts were 
located outside the issuing judge’s judicial circuit.1 The decision 
immediately affected over thirty defendants on certiorari for wide-
ranging drug importation indictments2 and restricted police officers’ 
ability to do their investigative jobs. The Court based its decision on 
legislative interpretation of the Georgia Wiretap Statute.3 
Before the year 2000, the Georgia Wiretap Statute included a 
territorial jurisdiction limitation that authorized only the superior 
court judges of the circuit wherein the interception device was to be 
placed to issue the applicable warrants. 4  The legislature later 
amended the statute to allow superior court judges having jurisdiction 
over the crime being investigated to issue warrants permitting the use 
of interception devices.5 In doing so, the General Assembly changed 
the focus from the device’s physical location to the location of the 
underlying crime.6 
The statute was again amended in 2002, as part of Georgia’s 
Support of the War on Terrorism Act of 2002, and provided: 
Upon written application, under oath, of the prosecuting 
attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime 
under investigation, or the Attorney General, made before a 
judge of superior court, said court may issue an investigation 
warrant permitting the use of [a wiretapping] device . . . for 
the surveillance of such person or place to the extent the same 
is consistent with and subject to the terms, conditions, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 427, 736 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2013). 
 2. Tyler Estep, DA: Ruling Would Let 35 Drug Traffickers Off The Hook, GWINNETT DAILY POST, 
Jan. 7, 2013, available at http://www.gwinnettdailypost.com/news/2013/jan/07/da-supreme-court- 
decision-would-let-35-drug. 
 3. Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 424–25, 736 S.E.2d at 399. 
 4. Luangkhot v. State, 313 Ga. App. 599, 602, 722 S.E.2d 193, 196 (2012) (citing O.C.G.A. 
§ 16-11-64(b)(1) (1999)), rev’d, 292 Ga. 423, 736 S.E.2d 397 (2013). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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procedures provided for by Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code Annotated, as amended.7 
This language removed the jurisdictional requirements on superior 
court judges and added conditional language requiring consistency 
with the federal wiretap statute.8 Ultimately, this led to the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s decision in Luangkhot v. State.9 
Despite multiple attempts by the legislature to broaden the 
jurisdictional scope of superior court judges regarding wiretaps,10 in 
Luangkhot v. State the Georgia Supreme Court found the Gwinnett 
County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue wiretap 
warrants.11 In that case, over thirty indicted defendants moved to 
suppress evidence obtained through wiretap investigations, claiming 
the Gwinnett court lacked jurisdiction to issue the wiretap warrants 
where the phones and listening posts were located outside of 
Gwinnett County, even though the crimes under investigation were 
committed inside the county.12 The defendants, in interpreting the 
Georgia wiretap statute, relied primarily on federal statute 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(1) and (3)13  which provide that “‘a judge of competent 
jurisdiction . . . may enter an ex parte order . . . authorizing or 
approving interception of wire . . . communications within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting[.]’”14 
According to the defendants, the language of the federal statute 
“imposes a ‘territorial jurisdiction’ upon Georgia superior court 
judges that is limited to the county in which the judge sits, and that 
therefore the Gwinnett County Superior Court judges . . . could not 
issue wiretap warrants for interceptions occurring beyond the bounds 
of Gwinnett County.”15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (2011). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Luangkhot, 292 Ga. 423, 736 S.E.2d 397. 
 10. Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 602, 722 S.E.2d at 196–97. 
 11. Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 428, 736 S.E.2d at 401. 
 12. Id. at 398. 
 13. Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 601, 722 S.E.2d at 195. 
 14. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2008) (“Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside 
that jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device authorized by a 
Federal court within such jurisdiction) . . . .”). 
 15. Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 601, 722 S.E.2d at 195. 
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The Georgia Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ motion, 
stating their reliance on the federal statute was misplaced.16 Instead, 
the court held the “territorial jurisdiction” language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(3) applied to federal court judges issuing wiretap warrants 
pursuant to the federal wiretap statute and not to state court judges 
issuing wiretap warrants pursuant to the state wiretap statute. 17 
Agreeing with the State’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Adams v. Lankford,18 the court stated “it is clear that Congress 
intended that state law would define the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of 
each state court.”19 Thus, the Georgia Court of Appeals turned to the 
state statute to determine the scope of an issuing superior court 
judge’s territorial jurisdiction.20 The statute’s plain language placed a 
territorial limitation on the prosecuting attorney applying for the 
warrant21 but only required that a superior court judge issue the 
warrant.22 Absent an express territorial limitation, the court then 
focused on the legislative history of the Georgia wiretap statute 
which clearly broadened jurisdictional authority with each 
amendment.23 Given the plain language and legislative history of the 
statute, combined with Congress’s intent for the states to define 
“territorial jurisdiction,” the Georgia Court of Appeals held that Code 
section 16-11-64(c) authorized Gwinnett County Superior Court 
judges to issue wiretap warrants for interceptions that occurred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 16. Id. at 601, 722 S.E.2d at 195–96. 
 17. Id. at 602, 722 S.E.2d at 196. 
 18. The defendants in the Lankford case were participating in a lottery ring operating in Atlanta. 
Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986). The evidence against the defendants was 
gathered pursuant to twelve wiretap warrants issued by a Fulton County Superior Court judge. Id. Out of 
forty-one tapped phones, twenty-three were located outside of Fulton County, thus the defendants 
claimed the Fulton County judge lacked jurisdiction to issue warrants over those twenty-three phones. 
Id. at 1494–95. The Fulton County Superior Court had jurisdiction over the crimes, therefore the only 
error the defendants alleged was that “the district attorney who applied for the wiretap orders and the 
judge who issued them were from the county ‘next door.’” Id. at 1497–98. The Eleventh Circuit held 
that the issuance of warrants for the twenty-three phones outside Fulton County was not a cognizable 
error in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because the alleged violations did not implicate Congress’ 
core concerns in passing Title III. Id. at 1500. 
 19. Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 601, 722 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 
1500 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 20. Id. at 602, 722 S.E.2d at 196. 
 21. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (2011) (“the prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction over 
prosecution of the crime under investigation”). 
 22. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (2011); Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 602, 722 S.E.2d at 196. 
 23. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (2011); OCGA § 16-11-64(b)(1) (2000); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(1) 
(1999); Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 602, 722 S.E.2d at 196. 
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outside of the county because the judges had jurisdiction over the 
investigated crimes.24 In doing so, the Court of Appeals denied the 
defendants’ motion to suppress evidence. 
However, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and held Georgia 
state law defined “territorial jurisdiction” as the judicial circuit in 
which the superior court judge presides.25 Admitting the legislature 
was authorized to carve out exceptions to this rule, the Georgia 
Supreme Court pointed out that it did not expressly do so, and thus 
applied this “default rule.”26 The Court did not agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the state wiretap statute’s general language 
permitting “‘a judge of superior court . . . [to] issue an investigative 
warrant,’” expressly granted superior courts broad authority to issue 
warrants outside of their judicial circuits.27 Instead, it held such a 
broad grant of power, absent any “evidence, textual or otherwise,” 
could not be granted under such terms.28 The Court went on to say 
that the legislature could have explicitly granted such authority.29 
Moreover, the fact that the legislature expanded territorial 
jurisdiction in other areas of the same bill gave weight to the 
presumption that its lack of explicitly granting the same broad 
authority in the wiretap statute was intentional.30 
This decision, handed down by the Georgia Supreme Court on 
January 7, 2013, created uncertainty for incarcerated offenders and 
defendants indicted on evidence gathered under wiretap warrants 
issued by a neighboring county. In response to the decision, Senator 
Jesse Stone (R-23rd) remarked that “‘[i]t’s not feasible to believe 
every circuit could afford to operate a $750,000 surveillance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 24. Luangkhot, 313 Ga. App. at 603, 722 S.E.2d at 197. 
 25. Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 428, 736 S.E.2d at 400. Several Georgia cases and statutes supported the 
Court’s conclusion. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 15-6-10 (1998) (a superior court judge “shall discharge all the 
duties required of him . . . for the circuit for which he was elected or appointed”); OCGA § 15-6-23 
(1998) (a superior court judge may sign warrants and other official documents “in any county 
comprising a part of his circuit”); State v. Lejeune, 277 Ga. 749, 752, 594 S.E.2d 637, 641 (2004) 
(stating a superior court’s authority to issue warrants is generally “limited to places within that court’s 
territorial jurisdiction[]”); Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 197, 206 S.E.2d 26, 31 (1974) (holding, under 
a prior version of the wiretap statute, that a superior court judge may issue warrants from any county 
within his circuit). 
 26. Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 427, 736 S.E.2d at 401. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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monitoring center’”31 and that the ruling “‘jeopardized bringing to 
justice drug cartels and other organized crimes because of a 
technicality about the current code’s allowance of surveillance 
devices.’”32 
Bill Tracking of HB 55 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Rich Golick (R-40th), Matt Ramsey (R-72nd), 
Alex Atwood (R-179th), B.J. Pak (R-108th), Christian Coomer (R-
14th), and House Minority Leader Stacey Abrams (D-89th) 
sponsored House Bill (HB) 55.33 On January 16, 2013, the bill was 
read for the first time and Speaker of the House David Ralston (R-
7th) assigned it to the House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee.34 The 
second reading occurred on January 17, 2013.35 On the following 
day, the Committee met to discuss the bill.36 The discussion was led 
by Representative Golick (R-40th), along with David McDade of the 
Douglas County District Attorney’s Office, Dan Mayfield of the 
Gwinnett County District Attorney’s Office, and Jason Saliba of the 
Cobb County District Attorney’s Office. 37  During the meeting, 
Representative Golick (R-40th) voiced his concern that the word 
“communication” in the pen register section of the amendment was 
ambiguous.38 Because the amendments were proposed in response to 
the Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law, 
Representative Golick (R-40th) felt the amendment should be as 
clear as possible. 39  At the suggestion of Dan Mayfield, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 31. Press Release, Georgia Senate Press Office, Senate Passes Bill Allowing State-Wide 
Surveillance Devices (Feb. 12, 2013), http://senatepress.net/senate-passes-bill-allowing-state-wide-
surveillance-devices.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. HB 55, as introduced, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 34. Video Recording of House Proceedings, Jan. 16, 2013 at 20 min., 00 sec., (remarks by Speaker 
of the House David Ralston (R-7th)), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2013/day-3. 
 35. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 55, May 9, 2013. 
 36. Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, Jan. 18, 2013, 
http://www.house.ga.gov/Committees/en-US/CommitteeArchives146.aspx.  
[hereinafter House Committee Video]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 41 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick (R-40th)). 
 39. Id. 
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Committee amended the statutory language from “[s]uch order shall 
have state-wide application and interception of communications shall 
be permitted in any location in this state” to “[s]uch order shall have 
state-wide application and the interception by use of a pen register or 
trap and trace device shall be permitted in any location in this 
state.” 40  On January 28, 2013, the House Committee favorably 
reported the bill by substitute.41 After the bill was read a third time on 
January 31, 2013, the House passed it by a 164 to 1 vote and 
immediately transferred the bill to the Senate.42 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
On February 1, 2013, the Senate read and referred the bill to the 
Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee43 and on February 6, 2013, 
the Committee favorably reported the bill.44 The second reading took 
place on February 7 and on February 12th the Senate read the bill a 
third time.45 The Senate then passed HB 55 by a 48 to 6 vote.46 On 
February 13, 2013 the House sent the bill to Governor Nathan Deal 
(R) to be signed into law.47 
The Act 
The Act amends Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated with the purpose of clarifying the jurisdiction and 
authority of a superior court judge granting a wiretap or electronic 
surveillance investigative warrant, along with granting state-wide 
application of such surveillance methods. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 40. Id. at 55 min., 08 sec. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick (R-40th)) (emphasis added); compare HB 
55, as introduced, § 2, p. 2, ln. 35–36, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 55 (HCS), § 2, p. 2, ln. 35–36, 
2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See House Committee Video, supra note 36, at 55 min., 08 sec. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick 
(R-40th)); Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 55 (Jan. 31, 2013). 
 43. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 55, May 9, 2013. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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Section 1 of the Act amends Code section 16-11-64.48 This section 
pertains to the statutory authority for capturing or intercepting the 
actual content of a communication,49 such as a phone conversation. 
The Act allows a district attorney with jurisdiction over a crime 
under investigation, or the state Attorney General, to apply for an 
investigative warrant permitting the use of surveillance devices, such 
as wiretaps.50 The Act specifies that a superior court judge may issue 
such warrants if he or she has jurisdiction over the crime under 
investigation.51 In a likely attempt to remove textual restrictions that 
would not encompass technological advances, the Act removed the 
reference to Code section 16-11-60 that defines the type of listening 
devices that can be used to effectuate these investigative warrants.52 
Furthermore, the Act gives such warrants state-wide application, 
allowing the interception of communications from anywhere within 
the state.53 Now, a district attorney with jurisdiction over a crime 
under investigation can apply for a wiretap warrant from a judge of a 
superior court also having jurisdiction over the crime, and the 
interception of the communications, or listening posts, can be located 
anywhere in the state. 
Section 2 of the Act revises Code section 16-11-64.1 to expressly 
allow state-wide application of warrants authorizing pen register or 
trap and trace devices.54 These devices allow investigators to gather 
real-time electronic recordings of the establishment of a connection 
between two phones, but they do not capture the content of the 
communication.55 Such data is used for monitoring and can be used 
as evidence in applying for a wiretap warrant.56 The Act additionally 
permits interception locations to be anywhere in Georgia.57 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 48. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 49. Id.; see House Committee Video, supra note 36, at 37 min., 51 sec. (remarks by David McDade 
of the Douglas County District Attorney’s Office). 
 50. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 12, 2013 at 1 hr., 14 min., 4 sec. (remarks by Sen. 
Jesse Stone (R-23rd)), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2013/day-16. 
 53. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 54. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64.1 (Supp. 2013). 
 55. See House Committee Video, supra note 36, at 37 min., 51 sec. (remarks by David McDade of 
the Douglas County District Attorney’s Office). 
 56. Id. 
 57. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64.1 (Supp. 2013). 
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Analysis 
Under the statutory interpretation principle “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius,” if the legislature sets forth a list without a 
modifying term like “for example,” then a court will infer that the 
legislature intended to exclude all items not listed.58 Section 2 of the 
Act states that an order issued by a superior court judge “shall have 
state-wide application and the interception by use of a pen register or 
trap and trace device shall be permitted in any location in this 
state.”59 Thus, a court applying the principle “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius” to the Act will likely infer that the legislature 
intended to exclude all methods of interception that do not use a pen 
register or trap and trace device. As technology advances, such an 
interpretation could prove problematic. This issue was addressed, 
however, during the House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee hearing 
on the bill.60 In response to a question on this very issue, Jason Saliba 
of the Cobb County District Attorney’s Office said that “trap and 
trace” and “pen register” are terms of art that have been used for 
twenty years and expressed his belief that the terms are defined 
broadly enough in Code section 16-11-60 to account for 
technological changes.61 
The legislature intended for the Act to be a narrow response that 
would return wiretap authorization to the status quo thought to exist 
before the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Luangkhot v. 
State.62 It was not meant to expand or reduce wiretap capabilities.63 
By using terms of art that have specific meaning in the area of 
wiretap authorization, the legislature hopefully avoided the statutory 
construction problems that led to the decision in Luangkhot v. State.64 
John Easley & Alyssa Rogers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 58. See, e.g., Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012). 
 59. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64.1 (Supp. 2013). 
 60. See House Committee Video, supra note 36, at 43 min., 30 sec. (remarks by Jason Saliba of the 
Cobb County District Attorney’s Office). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 26 min., 45 sec. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick (R-40th)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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